....

Rerival of traditional philosophy [of China]

The debate undoubtedly paved the way for the resurgence of traditional Chinese philosophy. The revival came especially in Fung Yu-lan (born 1895) and Hsiung Shih-li (1883-1968).

Trained in philosophy at Columbia University, Fung derived his Rationalism from the Neo-Confucian school of principle, whose concepts he converted into formal, logical ones. In his “New Rationalism” set forth in 1939, there are four fundamental concepts: principle, material force, the substance of Tao, and the Great Whole. The concept of principle is derived from the Ch’eng I-Chu Hsi proposition that “As there are things, there must be their specific principles.” To Fung, however, whereas a thing must follow principle, principle does not have to be actualized in a thing. The concept of material force is derived from the Ch’eng-Chu proposition, “If there is a principle, there must be material force.” To Fung, it is true that material force, being the material of actualization, is the ground and power of existence; but such force itself does not exist as a thing either in principle or in the actual world. Tao means a “universal operation,” the universe of daily renewal and incessant change. Finally, the Great Whole, in which all is one and one is all, is the Absolute. All four are treated as formal concepts and not as assertions about the actual world. Basically, Fung’s philosophy is a combination of Neo-Confucianism and Western Realism and logic; but in regarding the world of actuality as secondary. He has really replaced Neo-Confucianism, essentially a philosophy of immanence, with a philosophy of transcendence. From 1936 to 1946, he wrote five books to complete this philosophy, which he has called a “new tradition.”

In 1950, soon after the communist triumph in China, Fung repudicated his own philosophy as Idealistic abstract, and devoid of historical and practical character.[1] From 1956 to 1963, he was severely attacked for advocating the “method of continuing abstract ideas” in Chinese philosophy and the idea of “form of universality” in Chinese concepts. In 1962-64, under Communist Party guidance, he wrote a new version of his influential History of Chinese Philosophy (1934), a version that he said was written from the Marxian point of view. Fung now maintains that Idealism and Materialism have conflicted, attacked, influenced, and penetrated each other throughout Chinese history; but he also insists that certain Chinese concepts, such as the Confucian jen, have a form of universality and that such abstract concepts should be perpetuated. He has remained silent in recent years. Apparently his “new version” still holds.

Just as the school of mind paralleled the school of principle, so the philosophy of Hsiung Shih-li parallels that of Fung. Hsiung’s philosophy is a “new Idealism,” which is based on the I Ching and, to some extent, on Wang Yang-ming but which is expressed in the terminology of the Buddhist Ideation only school. According to him, reality is an endless process of production and reproduction, giving rise to a new transformation at every instance. But reality and manifestation, or substance and function, are one. In its closing aspect (when the universe becomes finite, contracts, and assumes a definite form), original substance tends to integrate into matter, whereas in its opening aspect (when the universe becomes free and infinite, expands, and has no formal restrictions), it tends to maintain its own nature and be its own master, and to result in the mind itself. Thus, Hsiung has avoided Chu Hsi’s bufurcation of principle and material force and Wang’s subordination of material force to the mind and has provided the idea of dynamic change in Neo-Confucianism with a metaphysical foundation. Completely ignored in mainland China, he has had considerable influence among Chinese philosophers abroad.

Marxism

In contemporary China, Marxism is the official philosophy. Marxist thought had been growing in China since the mid-1920s, and by the time of the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, it had gone through Leninism to Maoism. The official ideology does not prohibit the study of traditional Chinese philosophy but has subjected it to critical evaluation and severe criticism. In 1955 a strong attack was launched against the pragmatist Hu Shih [2] for his “reactionary philosophical thought” and for his undermining of Materialism in Chinese philosophy. From 1957 to the middle of 1960, many debates were carried on and many books and journals published. One topic of debate centred on the nature of the history of Chinese philosophy. Though there was no unanimity of opinion, the “correct” viewpoint was that the history of Chinese philosophy is but a part of the world history of philosophy and as such is a history of the struggle between Materialism and Idealism. The conflict between the theories of the original good and evil character of human nature, the opposition between principle and material force, the contradition Being and Non-being, and conflict between names and actuality were given as evidence of this continuous struggle. As such, the history of Chinese philosophy is but the development of Marxism-Leninism in Chinese history. That part of China’s philosophical heritage that is Materialistic and possesses a class nature must be continued and promoted. And this must be done under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung’s writings.[3]

In pursuance of this objective, many naturalistic philosophers were interpreted as Materialists; Materialism in certain philosophers was magnified; and minor Materialists were given a prominence entirely out of proportion to their thought, work, or influence in Chinese history. Chang Tsai, who replaced universal principle with material force as the ultimate reality, Wang Fu-chih (1619-92), who equated concrete things with Tao, and Tai Chen, who revolted against the suppression of human desires, were all hailed as great Materialists.

In this intellectual climate, Lao-tzu and Confucius, as well as other classical philosophers, were critically revaluated. In a forum in 1959 and in later publications, some thinkers interpreted the concept of Tao in Materialistic terms on the grounds that Tao is the basic substance of all things, their necessary nature, the law of change, the condition of existence, and the sum total of things. Others argued that the concept of Tao is Idealistic because Tao is indescribable, transcends space and time, comes from Nonbeing, is the one and Absolute, and is spirit. In any case, the official view is that only the Materialistic aspect of Lao-tzu should be continued.

From 1960 to 1962, 13 discussion meets were held on Confucius. The discussions revolved around four main questions: (1) Confucius’ concept of Heaven, (2) whether he was an Idealist, (3) his doctrine of jen and rites, (4) and his standpoint. The discussion on Heaven dealt not so much with the metaphysical nature of Heaven as with the Heaven mandate, whether it was deterministic or alterable through man’s effort. Confucius was described variously as an Idealist and a Materialist, depending upon whether one understood Confucius’ Heaven as physical or as the Supreme Being and upon whether or not the Way of Heaven of which Confucius spoke meant physical natural laws. As to jen and rites, many felt that the Confucian jen meant love for one’s own class, that the rites were designed to support slavery, and that both should therefore be attacked and rejected; but Fung Yu-lan insisted that the Confucian jen possessed in itself a universal character – i.e., a love for all. Again, the general view was that only the progressive and Materialistic elements should be continued. Other philosophers such as Wang Fu-chih have also been discussed at the forums, but Neo-Confucianism has been virtually ignored both in the meetings and in publications.[4]

Mao Tse-tung is not labelled as a philosopher, but his two essays, “On Practice” (1937) and “On New Democracy” (1940), have set the pattern and determined the direction of Chinese philosophy in China. In his “On Practice,” he wants people to “discover truth through practice and through practice to verify and develop truth.” Though Mao is putting forth the dialectical Materialistic Theory of knowledge and doing, one cannot help noticing the influence of the traditional Chinese emphasis on the correspondence of words and deeds and Wang Yang-ming’s doctrine of unity of knowledge and action. In his essay “On New Democracy,” Mao says that “the new democratic culture is scientific ... and it can never form a united front with any reactionary idealism.” A splendid ancient culture was created during the long period of China’s feudal society, he said, but “its feudal dross must be thrown away and its democratic essence absorbed.” In short, the philoso in new China must be practical, scientific, democratic, and popular; i.e., for the masses, philosophers and intellectuals must go to the masses and work on the farms. All abstract concepts, Idealistic theories, and subjectivisms of any kind must be thrown overboard. Instead, philosophy must be practical and aim at the concrete development of society. Thought and practice and intellectuals and the working masses must be united. The effort in China is not to develop any new theory of technical philosophy or produce any individual philosopher but to meet the practical needs of the masses. In terminology and reasoning, this philosophy is sharply different from traditional Chinese philosophy, but there is still the essential agreement that man should accupy the centre of thought.

- From the New Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropedia, Knowledge in Depth, 15th Edition